Over the past year and a half, the narrative surrounding the October 7, 2023 attack by Hamas has been framed as an unprecedented act of unprovoked, genocidal brutality, a defining moment in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This framing served to justify the most devastating military onslaught Gaza has ever endured.
However, a recent report by Israel’s Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency) challenges this portrayal, revealing a far more complex reality. The intelligence agency’s findings suggest that Israeli policies — specifically those under Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu — played a direct role in enabling Hamas’ military buildup, ultimately leading to the devastating attack.
While the report takes responsibility for intelligence failures, it also subtly implicates Netanyahu’s government, highlighting its role in facilitating Qatari funding to Hamas and ignoring key warning signs ahead of the invasion.
Netanyahu’s Funding for Hamas
According to The Jerusalem Post, one of the report’s most striking revelations is its confirmation that Netanyahu’s administration allowed Hamas to receive financial support from Qatar, despite internal warnings about the risks:
Israeli intelligence has said that Qatar eventually developed two funding pipelines to Hamas. One was supervised by Israel and, at least officially, only went to Gaza’s civilian needs. However, Israeli intelligence has said that another funding pipeline, especially in more recent years, circumvented Israeli oversight and went directly to Hamas.
The October 31, 2023, interview by The New American of Alex Krainer highlighted Qatar’s significance.
The Post says that even the officially monitored funds indirectly strengthened Hamas’ military capabilities, as they allowed the group to divert more of its existing resources toward building its vast tunnel networks, manufacturing rockets, and training its fighters.
The report also highlights that Netanyahu personally opposed plans to assassinate key Hamas leaders before the attack, a decision that may have allowed the group to maintain its leadership structure and prepare for October 7.
Ignored Warning Signs
Shin Bet’s report also details a series of intelligence failures that preceded the Hamas invasion. According to the findings, Israeli security forces had multiple early warnings but failed to act on them.
The Post writes:
The Shin Bet revealed that SIM cards and sensors along the border were activated ahead of time but were ignored.
The outlet further stresses:
Most of the [agency’s] report, however, was about the Shin Bet’s own failures. It did not warn about an invasion, it misinterpreted Hamas’s intentions — both before October 7 and on the day — it failed to adjust to Hamas as a sophisticated military entity, allowing Hamas to massively arm itself, and it did not recognize the depth of the harm being done to Israeli deterrence.
The report acknowledges some critical intelligence failures. Officials misinterpreted Hamas’ intentions, believing the group was planning an attack in the West Bank, not in Gaza.
Overconfidence in Israel’s high-tech border fence further compounded this miscalculation. Security forces relied on it as a primary defense, failing to anticipate its vulnerabilities. As a result, Hamas was able to carry out its attack with minimal resistance.
Ben-Gvir’s Policies
While Netanyahu is not directly named in the report, Shin Bet flags several policies enacted under his leadership that escalated tensions with Hamas.
One of the most controversial figures mentioned is former National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir. He played a key role in altering the “status quo” at the Temple Mount and intensifying pressure on Palestinian prisoners — two flashpoints that Hamas cited as justification for its October 7 attack.
The Temple Mount, known to Muslims as Al-Haram Al-Sharif, is one of the most sensitive religious sites in the world. Home to Al-Aqsa Mosque, Islam’s third-holiest site, it has been a long-standing focal point of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Since 1967, following the Six-Day War, a status quo agreement has governed the site. The agreement restricted Jewish prayer to avoid religious and political escalation. Any Israeli encroachment on Al-Aqsa has historically led to violent uprisings, including the Second Intifada (2000-2005).
Despite these historical sensitivities, Ben-Gvir increased Jewish visits to the Temple Mount and openly called for changing the status quo. Both the United States and Arab nations, including allied Jordan and Egypt, condemned his actions. The actions also fueled Hamas’ rhetoric of “defending Al-Aqsa.”
In parallel, Ben-Gvir implemented harsher policies on Palestinian prisoners, cutting visitation rights and restricting privileges. Hamas, which has long used prisoner-related grievances to rally support, leveraged these moves to justify military action.
Shin Bet had warned that these policies — especially those targeting Al-Aqsa — could spark a violent backlash. But the warnings were ignored. By disrupting the fragile status quo of one of the most volatile sites in the region, Ben-Gvir’s policies provided Hamas with a clear pretext for launching its attack, reinforcing a cycle of escalation that Israeli intelligence had long sought to avoid.
Shin Bet: Reforms Alone Won’t Prevent Future Disasters
Despite acknowledging its own failures, the Shin Bet report warns that internal reforms will not be enough to prevent similar disasters in the future. The agency argues that deeper structural changes are needed in the relationship between Israel’s political leadership and its defense institutions.
The Jerusalem Post notes:
At another key point in the report, the Shin Bet wrote that even as it was implementing its own vast reforms for its massive failures on October 7, these would be insufficient in preventing future disasters, barring changes in the interface between the political and defense echelons.
Strategic Failure With Political Roots
Shin Bet’s findings present a damning indictment of Israel’s security approach leading up to October 7. While the intelligence failures were significant, however, they were not the only factor in Hamas’ success.
Netanyahu’s long-standing strategy relied on using Hamas as a counterweight to Palestinian statehood. He facilitated Qatari funding to the group and repeatedly ignored warnings from security officials. These policies helped create the conditions that made the October 7 attack possible.
The Shin Bet report confirms what critics have long warned about. Israel’s own leadership, through short-sighted decisions, played a direct role in fueling the very crisis it is now fighting. The response has been unmatched in brutality, carried out with unwavering American support.
A Brief P.S.: Crumbling Narrative of October 7
The symbolic canonization of October 7 has been unraveling with significant revelations. The Western media and political class actively buried many of these findings.
Last July, Haaretz confirmed that the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) invoked the “Hannibal Directive.” This extreme military protocol aims to prevent the capture of Israeli soldiers — even if it means killing them. The revelation raises serious questions about the actual death toll. The exact number of Israelis killed by Hamas versus those killed by the IDF in its desperate attempt to stop kidnappings remains unknown.
Meanwhile, independent journalists have scrutinized initial reports of Hamas’ alleged brutalities. Outlets such as The Grayzone have challenged widely circulated claims. Some of the most inflammatory stories — such as mass rapes and beheaded infants — have lacked verifiable evidence. This has led to growing skepticism about how these narratives were used to justify Israel’s military escalation in Gaza.
These narratives played a significant role in securing Western support for Israel’s military actions in Gaza. This backing came despite the substantial civilian casualties and the widespread destruction that followed.
Taken together, these developments reveal that the initial portrayal of October 7 was far more complex than first reported. As new evidence emerges, it is prompting a reevaluation of both the events themselves and the responses they justified.
